The Witness Box

Commenting on expert evidence, economic damages, and interesting developments in injury, wrongful death, business torts, discrimination, and wage and hour lawsuits

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Defending age discrimination suits just got tougher

In a 7-1 ruling, the Court said that when older workers are disproportionately affected by an employment decision, the employer bears the burden of explaining whether there was a reasonable explanation other than age for the company's action.


No. 06-1505
Title:
Clifford B. Meacham, et al., Petitioners
v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, aka KAPL, Inc., et al

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Tuesday, September 18, 2007

Undocumented worker wage hour lawsuit survives

Court says:

"Although defendants have clearly articulated the tension between the competing policy considerations of the IRCA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the relevant provisions of New York's Labor Law, the cases cited by defendants in support of their motion do not establish that they are entitled to dismissal of Huerta's complaint.

"No court has held that an undocumented alien may be deprived of wages for work already performed." Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 25 AD3d 14, 26, 802 N.Y.S.2d 56 (2d Dep't, 2005), aff'd sub nom. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, supra." Jara v. Strong Steel Doors, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, KINGS COUNTY, 2007 NY Slip Op 51755U; 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6355, September 12, 2007.

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Wednesday, September 05, 2007

Daubert watch: Court allows economist to testify on damages of Mexican nationals

(see dauberttracker.com)

In a case concerned with wrongful death actions brought by the families of two Mexican Nationals, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' expert did not have sufficient facts about the two decedents and their families and that the expert used statistics about the US for the purpose of calculating the plaintiffs' losses. The plaintiffs' families lived in Mexico.

The court said that to the extent Dr. Ward might have been able to obtain more complete information, that fact went to the weight to be ascribed to his opinions, not to their admissibility.

The district court noted that the plaintiffs' expert acknowledged at the conclusion of his reports that the plaintiffs resided in Mexico, and that the calculation of the plaintiffs' economic losses must be converted to Mexican standards and that this conversion constituted the application of reasonably reliable principles and methods to the facts known to the plaintiffs' expert.

see:


Alvarado vs. Loftus
Date of Decision: 3/19/2007
Jurisdiction: Federal
Docket Numbers: 05-cv-01666 REB-PAC
Court: Colorado

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9/11 Judge puts damages first

(excerpt from NYT)

Little-noticed lawsuits brought against the airlines, security companies move toward trials.

In a reversal of the usual legal procedure, the Judge in some of the first 9-11 cases to go to trial has ordered six trials for damages to take place before any trial for liability.

Instead of focusing on the merits of the cases, the trials will focus instead on the victims' pain and suffering and on the grief of their surviving families. The plaintiffs acknowledge that the biggest difference between the two sides is over the value of pain and suffering. Economic losses are calculated by a mathematical model, and the margin for dispute is relatively small.

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Thursday, May 03, 2007

Medical expenses - billed or amount recieved by the provider

When totaling medical expenses in an injury case, is the amount billed or the amount accepted by the provider as payment in full the relevant number?

(thanks to the popular forensic economist bulletin board for this posting idea...)

While most of the legal opinions out there say the billed amount is correct, there is at least one state court case allowing testimony for the amount accepted.

In at least on instance in Federal District Court case the trial court judge, allowed the defense to present testimony about the amount the defendant (the government) would pay through its various health insurance programs and how much the plaintiff would actually pay as copay. The defense's reasoning was that the US was ultimately paying for everything, assuming the plaintiff won the case and received all his expected copays.

As such, the defense reasoned it was not collateral source as it didn’t come from some third party. Since, under the defenses theory, it was not a collateral source, the amount paid by the defendant could be considered as an offset in th damages calculation. In the trial, the court allowed the US to bring in a claims adjuster from Medicare and from Tricare to explain just how much they would pay and which procedures would be covered. They allowed me to use those estimates in determining the loss.

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Friday, January 05, 2007

What some judges think about economic testimony

A task force of judges, attorneys and economists were tasked with determining if economic evidence in anti-trust cases was useful or confusing to judges and juries. In a nutshell, the economists generally believed that their testimony was useful and not confusing. In contrast:

“A majority of Task Force members believe that there is a problem with confusing economic testimony in the federal courts....some characterize the problem as significant and others characterize it as only modest…"


See, 'Final Report of Economic Evidence Task Force" August 1, 2006' (at the bottom of the page..)

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Friday, December 01, 2006

Relying on the words and works of others

Daubert on the web reports that decision in Linn v. Fossum, No. SC05-134 (Fla. Nov. 2, 2006) limits experts ability to rely on consultations with colleagues and related experts. This cases has the potential to affect the way that economists and vocational experts work together. For more, see:

Experts May Not Testify on Direct to Reliance on Consultations with Colleagues, Florida Supreme Court Rules

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Tuesday, August 23, 2005

Dispatches from the courtroom: Throwing punches at the opposing sides economic damage expert

The following is an account from one of our lostcompensation economist. He was just deposed in an employment discrimination case that involved the wrongful termination of a textbook sales woman.

The testimony went well, I think. The opposing attorney and his economist were not able to find any calculation problems in our analysis. This is always a good feeling.

Overall, the opposing attorney was polite, but he was just hell bent on getting me to say that since the plaintiff was on commission, we should have somehow accounted for this in the economic analysis. None of the car allowance or other fringe benefit stuff came up. It was really all about commissions for this guy.

We literally went around and around on the commission issue. He got quite frustrated at me at several points. He would ask a question one way, then another way. He would get the same answer, which of course was not the one he wanted, over and over again. I even started reading the report to him at points. (Not in an arrogant way, but to just point it out to him what our report actually said.)

He also kept trying to restate my testimony, something to the effect 'so what you are saying is [this].." Much to his displeasure, I would simply say 'no, what I am saying is [that]....

This line of questioning continued for many rounds. He would say, 'but isnÂ’t that what I said?', I would say no. At one point, we were quibbling over what he thought said. Felt a little like grade school at points.

At many points, where he would actually have a valid point I felt, he just would not stop with his questions or he would, because of his irritation, ask it in an open ended way that allowed for an explanation.

For example, he said 'So you do not think that it was appropriate in this case to do a projection of her future commissions with [the previous employer]?' I would answer, no. Instead of letting it go and having the potentially contradictory no answer on the record, he was literally ready to fight and would indignantly say something like 'and why not'.

Of course, the 'and the why not' question allowed me to go on add-nausea about the labor market and how it works so wonderfully (which it does!). The workings of the labor market, I would explain, allow me to focus on her actual earnings no matter how they were earnedcommissionn or base salary. That is a person with her skill set will earn what her skill set is worth. This value is reflected by her past earnings history in this case.

There were also numerous documents in the file that suggest that the earnings projections that we made were very conservative. For instance, in the 4 months before the company fired her, she earned more in commissions than she had the previous year. The opposing attorney actually, by mistake no doubt, made me aware of this fact.

To counter these types of facts, he would, at least I felt, introduce his own testimony on the issue. His testimony and ‘representations’ about other’s testimony in the case of course made the facts at issue untrue or true as he needed them. Of course this further lengthened the deposition, because I would not agree to any of his 'facts' or his representation of the facts. And so on and so on....until the break of evening we went.

Overall it was a challenging depo.

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Wednesday, June 15, 2005

Hedonics Update: Utah

Inspired by an attorney's inquiry who was interested in the standing of hedonic damages in his state, here is a closer look at hedonics in Utah.

Utah does allow hedonic damages as a part of pain and suffering. The pain and suffering for which damages are recoverable in a personal injury action in Utah include not only physical pain but also mental pain or anguish, that is, the mental reaction to that pain and to the possible consequences of the physical injury. Included in mental pain and suffering is the diminished enjoyment of life, as well as the humiliation and embarrassment resulting from permanent scars and disability.

An article by Mark Glick called "The Law and Economics of Tort Damages" states the following regarding a case in Utah and its implications:

Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980) ("[i]ncluded in mental pain and suffering is the diminished enjoyment of life"). The problem with pain and suffering is that both concepts are closely tied to the injury itself. The level of physical pain that the victim can be expected to experience is closely linked to the nature of the injury. In the eyes of the juror, the answer to the question "how much does it hurt" will likely come from consideration of the injury itself. The concept of suffering is closely connected to the concept of pain, but may include mental suffering as well. Again, as a practical matter, jury assessments of the intensity and duration of suffering closely associate it with the corporeal injury. Moreover, the categories of proof for enjoyment of life and pain and suffering are distinct. For example, compare the case of two artists of equal talent, each of whom loses an arm as a result of negligence. The first artist has an arm surgically severed by mistake at the hospital, while the second has an arm mangled in an auto accident. The loss of enjoyment of life would focus on the activities of life before the injuries, while the pain and suffering analysis focuses on the physical and mental response to the injury itself. When these separate categories are combined inevitably, the second artist is likely to receive the larger award for pain and suffering regardless of the pre-injury evidence.

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Friday, May 27, 2005

Hedonic damages

Below is a wonderful summary of where hedonic damages are at the current time. It is a note from a listserv post by Stan Smith, Ph.D. Dr. Smith (http://www.smitheconomics.com) is one of the leading and most respected economist in the area of hedonic damages. Here is his post (Thanks Dr. Smith for the most insightful update!)

UPDATE ON HEDONIC DAMAGES IN THE COURTROOM (From Dr. Stan Smith):

New Jersey and Nevada continue to be states where testimony on the value of life in non-fatal injury cases is admitted a very high percentage of the time. The same is true in Arkansas for non-fatal as well as - note this - fatal injury cases. Arkansas is of the very few states that allow for the value of life of the decedent. Montana and Arizona have also allowed my testimony in non-fatal injury cases this year although the long record is mixed.

In the past, overall, half the states and about two thirds of the Federal Circuits have admitted my testimony on hedonic damages, but most of these states/circuits have a broad mix of admitting and denying economic testimony on the loss of enjoyment of life in non-fatal injury cases.

A very few states have ruled against it in Supreme Ct. cases, these are Nebraska, Mississippi (used to be for it, but now disallowed by statute now) and West Virginia to my recollection. No Federal appellate court has affirmed the denial it so far as I know, but one has affirmed the admission, an Ohio Federal appellate court, which said it met Daubert.

An appellate ruling stating that a trial judge did not abuse discretion in excluding hedonics is not a ruling against hedonics no more than the converse is a ruling for hedonics.

There are a few intermediate state courts have ruled against it, and a few for it based on Daubert, in a handful of states. An appellate court for Los Angeles comes to mind as having having ruled against it, for example.

It seems that since the term Hedonic Damages was incorporated into the 9/11 Victim Compensation Act passed by the Senate (the Airline Stabilization Act) as an element of damages approved for compensation, this has been somewhat persuasive to a number judges. Feinberg, in implementing the Act, set a rather low fixed sum on the value, at $250K, for reasons which I can understand, but do not necessarily agree with.

**********

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Friday, January 21, 2005

Dispactches from the courtroom 1.20.2004

A ruling in support of the scientific method

Daubert motions commonly strike fear in the hearts of economic experts. However, as the courts become more and more aware of the techniques that are used by experts, the gatekeeping role of the courts has the potential of becoming less of a fearful burden for experts. In fact the gatekeeping role can actually help experts overall by keeping the level of work at a higher level and allow them to actually dig deeper into some of the more relevant scientific issue that underlie the economic expert analysis.

As reported on Daubertontheweb, The CA Court of Appeals upheld an exclusion of economic damage testimony that did rely on sound science. See below.

Daubertontheweb:

Its expert insisted that the Puerto Rico market was unique, and so he did not consult data from other markets or perform any regression analysis. "A witness who invokes 'my expertise' rather than analytic strategies widely used by specialists is not an expert as Rule 702 defines that term," said the Court of Appeals. If the expert "could or would not explain how his conclusions met the Rule's requirements, he was not entitled to give expert testimony. As we so often reiterate:

'An expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value to the judicial process.'"

See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp., No. 04-1635 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2005) (Easterbrook, Kanne, & Evans, JJ.).

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Saturday, January 15, 2005

Dispatches from the courtroom 1.15.2005

In a Virginia wrongful death case, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the testimony of an economic expert witness in a wrongful death case should have been excluded because of its unreliability. Thanks to (SW VIrginia Law Blog)

In this case, the court concluded, among other things, that the plaintiff's expert utilized unrealistic assumptions to construct the economic damage report. The court found that the economists earnings projections did not comport with the facts in the case. Background concerning the economic experts testimony and excerpts from the court's decision can be found below in this post.

The bottomline: Using realistic assumptions is crucial. In this case, the court nor the defendants had any issue with the qualifications of the plaintiffs expert, it was his inability to build a economic damage model that was soundly based on the case facts that the courts took issue with.


Click here to download decision

Background on what the economist did (from the court's decision):

No objection was made to his [the economist's] qualifications. He testified that
Mrs. Mabini’s lost income and benefits would have amounted to
$121,533 if she had worked until age 60 and $203,145 if she
had worked until age 66. He gave the value of her lost
household services as $343,287 and reasonable funeral expenses
as $12,403.

His calculation of the total economic loss to the
beneficiaries was thus $477,223 based on retirement at 60 and
$558,835 based on retirement at 66. These conclusions were
necessarily dependent upon certain assumptions to which the
defendants objected:


*that the decedent would have found fulltime employment the day after the accident at a wage of $8.00 per hour ($16,000 per year) and

* would have remained so employed until retirement;

* that her employer would have provided additional contributions amounting to 3.7% of her income in the form of a “401(k)” or similar retirement benefit;

* that her income would increase by 4.25% per year, and that Pomeroy, her dependent adult son,

*would have continued to live 24 years into the future even though the witness knew that he had died before trial.

*The defendants also objected to the witness’ failure to consider the life expectancy of the
decedent’s husband in arriving at the economic value of her
lost household services.


The Court said (from SW Virginia Law Blog):


In Vasquez v. Mabini, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the testimony of an expert witness in a wrongful death case should have been excluded because of its unreliability.

The expert gave testimony based on assumptions that the decedent (who in life never made more than $7,000 in a year) would get a job paying at least $16,000 per year, get a 401(k) savings plan, get a bunch of raises, and so on.

The Court explained:"We have never, however, construed [Va. Code 8.01-401.1] to permit the admission of expert testimony that lacks evidentiary support. . . . Estimates of damages based entirely on statistics and assumptions are too remote and speculative to permit 'an intelligent and probable estimate of damages.' . . . .

Expert testimony founded upon assumptions that have no basis in fact is not merely subject to refutation by cross examination or by counter-experts; it is inadmissible. . . . Furthermore, expert testimony is inadmissible if the expert fails to consider all the variables that bear upon the inferences to be deduced from the facts observed."

Analyzing the expert's conclusions that the decedent would have obtained full-time work, what it would have paid, what raises she would have obtained, were all not based in fact, even where they involved otherwise valid statistics.

The Court concluded:"Because the expert testimony was based upon fictional assumptions not supported by the evidence, it was speculative and unreliable as a matter of law and should have been stricken."

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Monday, December 06, 2004

Thorny legal issues concerning expert witnesses (12.6.04)

Can a judge bar an expert witness from testifying in their court for life?

That is the question facing a expert witness in GA today.

As reported in the professional section of American Medical News and Daubert on the web's Blog 702, a medical doctor is facing a lifetime ban on providing expert witness testimony by a GA state judge. According to the reports, the judge banned the expert because he found the expert's testimony to be "conflicting, lacking in credibility and apparently untruthful." The judge was also apparently concerned about the fact that the doctor recanted significant portions of the prior deposition testimony that he had given in the case.

The legal commentators at Blog 702 and several other legal commentators mentioned in the AMN article, seem to think that the legal precedent for the judge's life ban is shaky.

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Thursday, October 21, 2004

By the numbers: Will it or won't it go to trial...

Something to consider when deciding who to use and how much to spend when retaining an economic expert:

Most times your economic expert will NOT be needed to provide testimony at either a deposition or trial.

Survey results show that:

About 20 percent of cases require a deposition of the expert
About 12 percent of cases require actual trial testimony by the expert.

Source:
Expert Communications
----Expert Witness Marketing and Training 140 Island Way, #288 Clearwater, FL 33767 Tel 727-467-0700 Fax 727-467-0800
Find additional articles and resources for the expert consultant at
http://www.expertcommunications.com/

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Daubert challenges to economic testimony

What does it mean for an economic expert report to be ' Daubert Quality'?

While no sensible economist would guarantee that their economic expert testimony will survive a Daubert-type challenge in court, there are things that a reasonable economist can do to help increase the odds that their testimony will survive a challenge. The court is actually pretty clear on what a Daubert quality economic expert report is.

For instance in a recent case, See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, No. 03-1681 (3d Cir. Oct. 18, 2004) (unpublished) (Sloviter, Van Antwerpen, & Cowen, JJ.) the court upheld the economic asset valuation testimony in the matter. (Posted on www.daubertontheweb.com/blog702.html)

The court found:

*The expert had the qualifications to make the testimony that he made

*The methodology that he relied upon was generally accepted and widely used in his field

*The testimony was relevant and provided the jury with insights that they could not make on their own

Excerpts from the opinion follow:

"The Kiesewetters next contest the admissibility of the Beneficiaries’ expert witness. The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Fed.R.Evid. 702. We have summarized the requirements of Rule 702 as focusing on the “trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit.” Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396,404 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Here, the record shows the Beneficiaries’ expert possessed the specialized expertise necessary for5qualification, employed a methodology necessary for reliability, and gave relevant testimony that assisted the jury. See generally In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d717, 741-743 (3d Cir. 1994). The expert had been qualified previously and testified herethat his methodology is customarily relied upon in his industry for the valuation of assets,a subject beyond the experience of most jurors. For these reasons, we discern no abuseof discretion as to the admission of the Beneficiaries’ expert."

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Monday, August 23, 2004

By The Numbers 8.23.2004

According the most recent data on federal appellate decisions concerning Daubert challenges on Blog 702:


87.9% of the time a district court decision to allow an expert witness testimony is challenged, the appeals court affirms the decision.


84.1% of the time a district court's decison to exclude an expert witness' testimony is challenged, the appeals court affirms the decision.


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Wednesday, August 04, 2004

Can economic expert reports be ruled inadmissible because the report was not detailed enough?

As forensic economist we have seen expert reports that vary greatly in terms of the amount of detail. Some economic expert reports for example, only include a table of the plaintiffs economic damages. Other economic reports include every single article referenced in the report as well as a description of the methodology used to construct the report. Of course, most fall somewhere in between.

A recent post, at Blog 702, (http://daubertontheweb.com/blog702.html) suggests that contrary to the common wisdom, expert reports do NOT have to show all the details to be admissible. Here is the post below:

Wednesday, August 04, 2004
5th Circuit Says Forensic Expert's Report Need Not Specify Protocols

In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit has rejected a criminal defendant's complaint that the reports of the prosecution's forensic experts failed to disclose the protocols used in testing contraband substances.

The relevant paragraph from the opinion:
Ashlock's main critique of the government's forensic testimony centers on the experts' failure to disclose the protocols they followed in testing the substances they identified as contraband, rendering it impossible for anyone other than a chemist to examine the test results independently and reach a conclusion regarding the identity of the substances tested.

Nothing in Rule 702 requires an expert to provide this level of detail, however. Instead, Rule 702 simply dictates that the party presenting the expert testimony must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reliable. See United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). At trial, the government met this burden by eliciting testimony revealing that:
(1) each expert held a bachelor's degree in chemistry and had extensive on-the-job training in forensic chemistry;
(2) each of the tests performed by the experts was generally accepted in the field of forensic chemistry;
(3) each of the tests was performed in accordance with the standard procedures used in the laboratory; and
(4) each expert had his or her results reviewed by another chemist in the laboratory or by a laboratory administrator.

Based on this evidence, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the government's expert-witness testimony under Rule 702.See United States v. Ashlock, No. 03-10615 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2004) (King, Barksdale, & Pickering, JJ.). It is sometimes contended, in civil litigation, that an expert's report should be stricken because it supplies insufficient detail to permit independent investigators to reproduce the expert's results.

That position is apparently so uncontroversially untrue, in the Fifth Circuit, that its rejection does not call for a published opinion. We note that under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996, may be cited as persuasive authority.

Thanks Blog 702, more great work!

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Tuesday, July 27, 2004

Depo humor

From a colleague's , in a book entitled “Disorder in the Court”.   Probably one of the person's first depos?

[Attorney] Q: Is your appearance here this morning pursuant to a Deposition Notice which I sent to your attorney?
 
[Expert] A: No, this is how I dress when I go to work.

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Tuesday, June 29, 2004

PointofLaw.com Blog: Another State rejects Daubert

PointofLaw.com | PointOfLaw Forum: Another State rejects Daubert

According to a post on Point of Law, by David Berstein, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the federal Daubert standard in favor of the less mechanistic and rigorous state standard. The case did not involve economic testimony.





David Berstein Reports:

On Friday, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the federal Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. The court decided to retain North Carolina's unique admissibility standard. Like Daubert, this standard purports to require that expert testimony be reliable. However, lest they get confused, the court advised lower courts in North Carolina that "application of the North Carolina approach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than the 'exacting standards of reliability' demanded by the federal approach. The court condemned Daubert's "gatekeeping" approach as putting "trial courts in the onerous and impractical position of passing judgment on the substantive merits of the scientific or technical theories undergirding an expert's opinion."

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Sunday, June 27, 2004

PeopleSoft | DOJ v. Oracle Antitrust Trial Is in Progress

PeopleSoft | DOJ v. Oracle Antitrust Trial Is in Progress

Interesting inside commentary from an ongoing trial, the first day atually opened up with economic testimony from Dean Campbell of UC -Berkely business school.

See Trial Day 11: June 22, 2004 post....

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Dispatches from the court room

A good working relationship versus a bad working relationship:

[The following story was relayed by one of our National Compensation economists who had the opportunity to serve as an damages economic expert in two class action lawsuits]

Jan 04: Bad working relationship

I was asked to perform an economic damage calculation for a large class action employment lawsuit. My job, among other things, involved calculating the lost back pay and front pay for the class members. From day one, the acrimonious relationship between the two sides in the case took me back a step. In short both sides fought over every single part of the case from discovery to dates for depositions.

As somewhat expected, the opposing counsel in the case treated me as the expert witness with a lot of disdain at the deposition. At the class certification hearing the treatment was worse, they called me everything short of a liar. Actually, I think they actually inferred that I was in fact a liar!

Jun 04: Good working relationship

Again, I was asked to, among other things, serve as an economic damage expert in a class action employment lawsuit. The job again involved calculating front and back pay. In this case, the two sides worked very close with each other and really had very few conflicts, other than who was right or wrong in a legal sense of course.

Completely opposite of the Jan 04 experience, the opposing counsel in the case treated me as the expert witness with an incredible amount of respect and professionalism. At the class certification hearing the treatment was just as professional.

What have I learned:

The number one thing this suggest to me as an expert is to pick your clients wisely. Although, as a business person you want to work with as many people and attorneys that you can, it is usually better to limit your engagements to those who fit into your scheme and big picture of work and professionalism the best.


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Thursday, June 10, 2004

Excess Baggage in the Court Room

What do attorneys ask economists bring to the court room when they testify? In an informal survey, revealed that 3 out of 6 economist bring the entire case file, most bring at least the report and a clean C.V.

Some of the comments from the survey were:

I like to just take the absolute necessary to the witness stand and leave my briefcase with file in the first row of the gallery. Any exhibits will be handed to you. Spreadsheets are either blown up or on ppt. Everything else is committed to memory.

I have found that because New York state court rules do not require submission of expert reports, NY trials often involve the adversary attorney asking to examine the expert's file, sometimes taking a recess to do so, prior to any cross-examination. This is forced upon attorneys since depositions are all but non-existent in NY. case

The whole d*mned file. There's nothing in there that can 'hurt' me. It's often the case that there's some obscure note that can help a lot.


For trial, I bring absolutely nothing to the stand, and am not allowed to bring anything for that matter. Any exhibits for my testimony are required to be submitted beforehand. In my briefcase I usually bring some notes and outlines to rehearse while waiting around, but that doesn't go up to the stand.

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Tuesday, June 08, 2004

FindLaw Legal News - Court: Retiree Pension Benefits Can't Be Cut

FindLaw Legal News - Court: Retiree Pension Benefits Can't Be Cut

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Monday that pension plans under federal law cannot change their rules to reduce or eliminate benefits to workers who retire early and then go back to work at other jobs.

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Thursday, June 03, 2004

Workplace Harassment Is Not Just About Sex Anymore

Workplace Harassment Is Not Just About Sex Anymore

SUNRISE, Fla., June 3 /PRNewswire/ -- Last year the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) resolved 87,755 charges of employment
discrimination for $236 million in monetary and other benefits. Sexual
harassment and gender-related claims made up only 30 percent of the cases. So
what are employers doing wrong now?
The largest number of EEOC complaints (35.1 percent) came from allegations
of race discrimination. This was followed by claims of retaliation for filing
a charge or cooperating with an investigation (27.9 percent), age
discrimination (23.5 percent), and discrimination based upon an employee's or
applicant's disability (18.9 percent). The figures add up to more than 100
percent because numerous complaints alleged more than one kind of
discrimination.
"Employers paid out $236 million last year and $257 million the year
before. These figures tell me that managers in a lot of companies aren't
doing their homework," says Ashley Kaplan, employment law attorney for
Sunrise, Fla.-based G.Neil Corp. "As a result, they also are putting
themselves and their organizations at financial risk."

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Tuesday, June 01, 2004

By The Numbers



By The Numbers:

Plaintiff's:

...won 55% of civil trials in county courts in the U.S.

...won out of every 5 abestos cases filed in state court

...were award punitive damages in less than 1 out of 10 cases filed in state court

....the average jury award fell over 50% over the last decade

Source:Bureau of Justice Statistics; Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001

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