Is ‘Revolutionary Catalonia’ and accompanying collectivization in e.g. Aragon evidence that anarcho-syndicalism/collectivization can work? via /r/CapitalismVSocialism

Is 'Revolutionary Catalonia' and accompanying collectivization in e.g. Aragon evidence that anarcho-syndicalism/collectivization can work?

Firm no. Let's consider the reality of this socialist buzzword– often offered to deflect "false socialism" of e.g. the USSR.

For these Civil War efforts to show that their methods can be practically successful, we require:

1) Implementation of methods on a practical scale.

2) Clear success reflective of both the economic prosperity (or at least viability) and 'cohesion' claimed characteristic of these methods.

To beat the increasing amount of ‘antiestablishmentarians,’ we will consider these requirements in various historiographic methods.

First, sure to please, we have a ‘from the bottom’ view of social history from Seidman. His account is based on primary source evidence.

He generally finds that collectivization was not implemented on a practical scale, and, where it was– in places for a time, 180,000 people lived in collectivized settings (not large relative to the total population, and these were in fact isolated, rarely collaborative and often hostile (not violently) ventures, but still 180,000 is a sample)– it quickly declined as issues became evident (footnotes included so Seidman’s statements can be sourced):

‘Only 18.5 % of the land in the Republican zone (and, of course, none in the Nationalist zone) was collectivized.’9

‘An inquiry by the Generalitat (Catalan regional government) at the end of 1936 revealed that only sixty-six localities had taken some collectivist measures, and over 1000 municipalities had not.’

‘Even in Aragón, supposedly the most revolutionary and anarchist of regions and where the CNT was often the dominant left organization, most of the land was not collectivized.’

‘From mid-1937 to the end of 1938 the number of collectives increased by 25 % while the number of collectivists dropped by 50 %.’109

And of course both he and sources from the time period note the terrorism, and gasp coercion that accompanied these movements:

In Catalonia: ‘No sooner were the insurgents routed and their leaders, Generals Goded and Fernandez Burriel, taken prisoners, to be shot a few days later, than anarchy broke loose in the city and the most uncompromising and least controllable of the Government’s allies set up upon an orgy of destruction.’ I won’t quote as liberally from this source as I can’t copy and paste—but it also holds accounts of the burning of religious buildings and 200-4000 ‘found dead’ a month.

Seidman again:

‘The atmosphere of terror and assassination of ‘fascists’ encouraged obedience to radical authorities. Militias composed of urban militants, often from CNT unions of Barcelona, marched through Aragón and imposed their idea of libertarian communism or socialism.’14

‘Considerable numbers of property owners, sharecroppers, renters, and braceros felt compelled or coerced into joining collectives.’15

‘In Aragón and Valencia, many individualistic peasants were obliged to join a union, Seidman, Collectives during the Spanish Civil War 211 02_Articles 30/2 23/2/2000 12:03 pm Page 211 whether the CNT or UGT.18 A system of fines and sanctions compelled new members to attend assemblies.’19

‘In the small town of Cabra de Mora (Teruel) with ninety inhabitants, prosperous sharecroppers (masaderos) — who probably held long-term leases — were, according to their enemies, sympathetic to their ‘feudal lords’.21 They strongly opposed collectivization. Nor was this town unique. Prominent landowners who offered long-term or advantageous contracts to the propertyless were elsewhere able to create loyal supporters.22 The proponents of collective farming were forced to call in the Aragón police to take over sharecropper land.’

You may be tempted to consider specific accounts as small factors relative to the overall trend—but note that the only really well documented collective only had 400 people. These were small ventures, so specific events are reflective. (Seidman)

So— there weren’t all that many collectivists, and they weren’t all that well organized, and collectivization and Catalonian revolution was violent—but did collectivization work?

Let’s consider Payne, an authority on this history. I haven’t read his 400+ page book on the Revolution, and I’m not going to as I have other things I’d rather do with my time, but I have gathered some bits of it to show here. Some of this is actually from a Reddit comment on AskHistorians that referenced the book liberally.

First, we look at production levels.

Payne finds that:

‘Wartime shortages, the loss of markets, and lack of raw materials, together with the disruptive effect of the collectivizations and worker control, made it impossible for Catalan industry to regain prewar levels of output. Production declined steadily.’ (p256-257)

He backs this up, noting data that show from January 1936 to January 1937, production declined 30%; by September 1938 it had fallen to just 33% of January 1936 He pegs unemployment at 10-15%, and shows the inflation of this time—100 is the 1913 price index in the data below, a ‘historic baseline for inflation.’

168.8 – January 1936 223.7 – January 1937 434.4 – January 1938 564.7 – December 1938

Clearly, the economy was in disarray. What caused these problems?

Well, we can’t discount that Spain was involved in a Civil War. But, just because war can be hard on economies does not mean that a bad wartime economy would have been a good peacetime one, let alone equal to—let alone better than— a specific other system in peacetime—there’s no evidence to support that.

As the narrative goes of one who may answer, ‘Revolutionary Catalonia,’ to the numerous incentive based efficiency issues I may raise with regard to alternate systems— the collectivists and Revolutionaries simply worked hard for each other, for their comrade, for the red, stateless dream of—well, not as much.

In reality, incentives became a clear issue and there was friction between those who perceived themselves as working very hard, and those whom the former perceived as layabouts.

Seidman:

‘The pressures of the outside world intensified internal difficulties. As the war endured, collectives became more selective about their membership. Perhaps this explains, in part, the decline of the ratio of members per collective. From mid-1937 to the end of 1938 the number of collectives increased by 25 % while the number of collectivists dropped by 50 %.109 New collectives in the summer of 1937 issued rules designed to limit the number of unproductive members. They excluded those past the age of sixty who had not previously joined, widows without children in collectives, and minors whose parents were not members. All who joined were required to stay for at least a year and had to become union members. At a meeting of CNT peasant organizations of the Center, a delegate from Toledo believed that support for the unproductive — that is widows, orphans, physically 224 European History Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 2 02_Articles 30/2 23/2/2000 12:03 pm Page 224 impaired, and elderly — was the most divisive issue among members.110 The CNT Regional Peasant Federation of the Center debated the issue of incentives versus the fixed (family) wage. The latter was viewed by many as the guarantee against the revival of pre-revolutionary inequalities. In the fall of 1936 the CNT regional unions of Catalonia and Levant had introduced the ‘family wage’ paid to the father according to the number of children.111 The Graus (Huesca) collective had begun with a family wage but by the fall of 1937 felt compelled to introduce an incentive based on production.112 On both collective and private lands, regional CNT officials reported that ‘agricultural production is declining and livestock is being rapidly consumed.’113 In the area east of Valdepeñas (Ciudad Real), ‘in the middle of the harvest, the union locals that controlled all the wealth of these towns did not do their job, and local union leaders had to be forced to work’. Men and machinery were unprepared or inadequate. One farm, whose electrification and mechanization reflected militants’ desires to rationalize agrarian production, was abandoned even though — with proper treatment — it could have become the breadbasket of the province. The productivity of laborers and harvesters had fallen well below the level it had reached during ‘the era of the bosses . . . Almost all workers don’t care about anything but getting their daily wage. They treat the controlled economy as though it were privately held.’ To increase output, incentives and piecework were recommended. CNT regional authorities also suggested assigning a devoted militant to each union and collective to control the ‘egotism . . . of some comrades’ which was reputedly destroying the economy. Given this debate over monetary incentives and discipline, it is fruitful to re-examine the common program signed by the CNT and the UGT on 18 March 1938. Observers have often interpreted it as a sellout by the CNT which agreed to Communist and UGT demands to end the family wage.114 However, the desire of the Confederation’s militants and leaders to motivate the base and compel it to work harder was also responsible for the decision tying pay to productivity.

Regarding specific instances in collectives, showing the development of hierarchy and a ‘state’ within the collective for those of you who don’t like states:

‘Conflicts 226 European History Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 2 02_Articles 30/2 23/2/2000 12:03 pm Page 226 over labor led the collective to pass more rules: Any comrade who was absent during work hours would be expelled from the collective on the third violation. The reluctance to sacrifice made the imposition of local foremen a necessity, and the leadership was given authority to discipline those who did not do their duty. The most important difficulty concerned how much collectivists should work. Some argued for infinite sacrifice; others wanted to define specific working hours. When the latter were set in January 1937, they were ignored by ‘those who did not show any real interest and came late or left early’. The problem of tardiness continued throughout the year. In fact, in Foucauldian fashion, lateness stimulated new control and accounting procedures. A comrade was given the task of recording all comings and goings of personnel. One member noted ‘we need statistics for those who do not know what work is and do not want to work.’ The assembly assigned one person ‘who could more or less read or write’ from every farm (finca) to catalogue its possessions and register daily entrances and exits of its wage earners. By June 1937, the cooperative store was tightly monitored. The divide between ‘those who work a great deal and others who hardly do anything’ became the major impediment in this and other collectives.124 The obligation to labor was universal in collectives, but in Lérida certain farms were notorious for doing little. Throughout 1937, workers left early and abandoned tools by the roadside. Propositions for elimination of the work-shy proliferated: ‘They all should be expelled for not doing their work. They don’t have the right to do what they want.’ Those who claimed that they were sick were told to get medical proof of it. At the end of May, the general assembly decided to award itself the right to discharge ‘comrades who don’t do their work’ and ‘those who are intoxicated’. One of the latter was excluded in August 1937. The assembly also banned workers who made false accusations and had to expel a violator on at least one occasion. Some members did not declare the income of their children who worked outside the collective. They wanted the cash that wage labor provided but, at the same time, did not wish to lose the benefits of collective membership. Their furtiveness violated rules on reporting of income and resulted in their expulsion. Other collectives enforced strict rules concerning the reporting of outside income, and demanded that members turn over all wages in excess of the standard collective salary.125 In August 1937 Seidman, Collectives during the Spanish Civil War 227 02_Articles 30/2 23/2/2000 12:03 pm Page 227 several members who worked undeclared second jobs were excluded. A few collectivists appropriated collective food for non-collectivist family members. By April 1937, tensions, which reflected the growth of the refugee population in the provincial capital, had developed between old and new members. The original members — who felt that they possessed the true collectivist spirit, that is ‘everything is for everyone without any class distinctions’ — believed that newer members ‘did not understand what a collective is’. They complained that the laborers referred by the Placement Office of Lérida were ‘not conscientious in their work for the collective’. The collective, it was said in June, ‘should not become a sanctuary’. By July, it had ‘too many people’. For their part, the newer members, who were refugees, felt that they were victims of discrimination. When in the summer of 1937, they organized their own clandestine meeting, the leadership reacted aggressively. The general assembly removed refugees’ right to speak and to vote, and permitted their expulsion. Tensions continued into the fall of 1937 when several members circulated a petition, which they sent to the Generalitat, that accused the leadership of stealing and corruption, a frequent complaint of collectivists about their officers.126 The leadership credibly refuted the charges and won firm support from the CNT’s local federation. Management was helped by the family history of one of its detractors: His wife and daughter had been caught at the border trying to flee with ‘thousands of pesetas’. The petition’s defenders were excluded from the collective.’

So, what was the problem with these efforts? Price controls, a surrounding war—to be sure. But it’s wrong to latch on to any example of people trying to carry out a philosophy and claim it to be successful when it clearly, by statistics and by bottom up perspectives, was not. These efforts were as unstable and economically fraught as their underlying philosophies.

+1 to the list of ‘not real %s’ % (your.altphilosophy)

EDIT: And this regarding efficiency, Steidman:

'Collectivists wasted large quantities of subsidized bread and other items provided at below market prices.49 Individual collectivists often had to be forced to pay their own personal arrears.50 Peasant reluctance to provide revenue and information was caused by a variety of fears. As has been seen, campesinos felt that the products of their labour might be unduly expropriated. Union locals, like the collectives, could not or would not provide reliable statistics on production. Spanish Republicans learned, as had the Bolsheviks, that ‘the class war was primarily a war for information.’'51